The Form of a Half-baked Creative Idea: Empirical Explorations into the
  Structure of Ill-defined Mental Representations by Scotney, Victoria S. et al.
 1 
Running head: CREATIVE IDEA ILL-DEFINED MENTAL REPRESENTATIONS 
 
 
The Form of a ‘Half-baked’ Creative Idea: 
Empirical Explorations into the Structure of Ill-defined Mental Representations 
 
 
Victoria S. Scotneya,1, Jasmine Schwartza, Nicole Carberta,2, Adam Saaba, & Liane Gaboraa,3 
 
aUniversity of British Columbia, Department of Psychology 
Irving K. Barber School of Arts and Sciences, Fipke Centre for Innovative Research 
3247 University Way, Kelowna, BC, Canada, V1V 1V7 
 
1Present address: Department of Psychological Sciences, Purdue University 
703 Third Street, West Lafayette, IN 47907-2081 USA 
  
2Present address: University of British Columbia, School of Population and Public Health 
2206 East Mall, Vancouver, BC, Canada, V6T 1Z3 
 
3Address correspondence to: Liane Gabora (liane.gabora@ubc.ca) 
 
Forthcoming in Acta Psychologica. Note: this draft may not be identical to the version that was 
accepted by Elsevier Press for publication. 
  
CREATIVE IDEA ILL-DEFINED MENTAL REPRESENTATIONS   2 
Abstract 
Creative thought is conventionally believed to involve searching memory and generating 
multiple independent candidate ideas followed by selection and refinement of the most 
promising. Honing theory, which grew out of the quantum approach to describing how concepts 
interact, posits that what appears to be discrete, separate ideas are actually different projections 
of the same underlying mental representation, which can be described as a superposition state, 
and which may take different outward forms when reflected upon from different perspectives. As 
creative thought proceeds, this representation loses potentiality to be viewed from different 
perspectives and manifest as different outcomes. Honing theory yields different predictions from 
conventional theories about the mental representation of an idea midway through the creative 
process. These predictions were pitted against one another in two studies: one closed-ended and 
one open-ended. In the first study, participants were interrupted midway through solving an 
analogy problem and wrote down what they were thinking in terms of a solution. In the second, 
participants were instructed to create a painting that expressed their true essence and describe 
how they conceived of the painting. For both studies, naïve judges categorized these responses as 
supportive of either the conventional view or the honing theory view. The results of both studies 
were significantly more consistent with the predictions of honing theory. Some implications for 
creative cognition, and cognition in general, are discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
Creative ideas often take time to mature before they reach their final form (Feinstein, 
2006). This leads to the interesting question: what form does a creative idea take midway 
through the creative process? Theories of creativity have rarely addressed this question directly. 
It is widely assumed that creative thought involves two phases: the generation of multiple 
discrete ideas, followed by the selection and development of the most promising (e.g., 
Engelmann & Gettys, 1985; Finke, Ward, & Smith, 1992; Simonton, 1999). This implies that the 
mental representation of the creative idea goes from encompassing a set of different possibilities 
to encompassing only one possibility that undergoes refinement. An alternative theory of 
creativity (Gabora, 2017), which grew out of mathematical models of concept combination, is 
that throughout the creative process there is only one mental representation of the creative idea 
but, due to its inherent ambiguity, it can manifest (i.e., actualize) as different outputs when 
viewed from different perspectives (like the different shadows cast by the same object when lit 
from different directions). This paper presents two studies carried out to investigate the form of 
creative ideas during the creative process. We begin by outlining currently predominant theories 
of creativity and what they imply about the form of an idea midway through the creative process. 
We then present an alternative theory of creativity, honing theory, that leads to a different 
conception of the form of a creative idea midway through the creative process. 
1.1. Search and Select Theories of Creativity  
We will refer to the bulk of existing theories of creativity as Search and Select (SS) 
theories, because searching and selecting from amongst possible candidates features prominently 
in many such theories, though not all such theories entail search, and not all entail selection. Nor 
are search and selection necessarily more prominent components of SS theories than other 
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processes such as divergent thinking and concept combination. However, divergent thinking and 
concept combination are also central to the alternative theory outlined in the next section, with 
which SS theories will be contrasted. Thus, the term ‘Search and Select’ was chosen partly 
because it emphasizes what distinguishes them, and should not be interpreted as distilling their 
core elements. 
An example of an SS theory of creativity, the Blind Variation Selective Retention 
(BVSR) theory (Campbell, 1960; Simonton, 1999, 2007, 2010, 2013), asserts that creative ideas 
come about through a trial-and-error combinatorial process involving blind generation of 
ideational variants followed by selective retention of the fittest for development into a finished 
product. The term ‘combinatorial’ is conceived of in the broadest sense, including both processes 
and procedures, and producing either ideas or responses. The variants are said to be ‘blind’ in the 
sense that their final utilities are unknown at the time of initial generation (in other words, the 
creator has no subjective certainty about whether they are a step in the direction of the final 
creative product). Potential idea variants are generated sequentially or simultaneously (Simonton, 
2013). While some are ultimately retained, others may be discarded at earlier stages. Although 
idea variants may have elements in common, each is regarded as a structurally distinct and 
separate entity, with its own probability and utility. Another example of a SS theory is the 
Geneplore model (Finke, Ward, & Smith, 1992) according to which, the creative process consists 
of a generative phase, where an individual constructs mental representations called preinventive 
structures, and an exploratory phase where those structures are used to come up with creative 
ideas. Existing computational theories of creativity are also SS theories (Besold, Schorlemmer, 
& Smaill, (2015). 
The assumption that the variants of a creative idea, or the constituents of which an 
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unfinished creative idea is composed, can be treated as distinct and separate entities is 
widespread. It is also implied in the Structure Mapping theory (SM) of analogical thought 
(Forbus, Gentner, & Law, 1995; Gentner, 1983, 2010). Analogy making is a central and 
ubiquitous facet of human creativity thatn features prominently in lists of creative processes 
(Finke, 1996; Martindale, 1998; Welling, 2007), and has played an important role in creative 
breakthroughs, inventions, and scientific discoveries (Gentner, 1989; Gentner & Markman, 
1997). Analogy making involves developing a better understanding of something that is not well 
understood, the target, by drawing upon something that is better understood, the source. A key 
principle of the structure mapping theory of analogy is the systematicity principle, according to 
which people prefer to connect structures composed of related predicates. The theory posits that 
analogy generation begins with finding all possible source-to-target content matches through a 
‘structurally blind’ quick and dirty parallel search of longterm memory that emphasizes surface 
similarity (Gentner, 2010; Gentner & Forbus, 2011). Potential sources are treated as distinct, pre-
existing entities located in memory that can in this initial stage be considered separately from 
each other and from the rest of the mental contents. A promising source is selected, and the 
source and target are aligned through identification of common relational structure referred to as 
candidate inferences (or one-to-one correspondences). These candidate inferences start to get 
combined into clusters (or kernels), which are eventually merged to give a single mapping 
between source and target (Gentner & Smith, 2012). 
These theories have much to offer and have advanced our understanding of creativity. 
However, while quite different, they bear some similarities that are called into question here. 
They treat ideas like objects in the physical world that can be independently chosen, assessed, 
and manipulated. They posit an initial stage in which each candidate idea or contributor to the 
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final idea can be treated as distinct and separate from other such candidates, and from the rest of 
the contents of the mind. While incorporating the combining of remote associates (Mednick, 
1962)—whether they be distantly related ideas, or analogues—they treat the remote associate as 
if it can be lifted, with its pre-existing ensemble of features or properties, and brought to bear on 
the creative task. They do not explicitly incorporate the notion of ‘potentiality,’ and thus do not 
contain a mechanism whereby the context elicits a never-before-noticed property in the associate. 
In other words, they do provide a means by which a property not conventionally thought to be 
related to the associate is, for the first time, retrieved as part of the associate, enabling the creator 
to generate, on the fly, the basis for the remote association. 
1.2. Honing Theory of Creativity 
Our everyday experience in a world of objects that exist in distinct locations and have 
definite boundaries may make it difficult to wean ourselves from the intuition that concepts and 
ideas in the mind behave this way as well (Gabora, 2019a,b). A more ‘ecological’ view is that 
they function not as fixed representations or identifiers, but as bridges between mind and world 
that are sensitive to context, and actively participate in the generation of meaning (Gabora, 
Rosch, & Aerts, 2008). This view is central to the Honing Theory of creativity (HT) (Gabora, 
2010, 2017, 2018, 2019a, 2019b), which grew out of a particular mathematical approach to 
concept interactions (Aerts, Sozzo, & Veloz, 2016; Aerts, Broekaert, Gabora, & Sozzo, 2016; 
Aerts, Gabora, & Sozzo, 2013; Aerts & Gabora, 2005a, 2005b; Busemeyer & Bruza, 2012; 
Busemeyer & Wang, 2015; Gabora & Aerts, 2002; Pothos, Busemeyer, Shiffrin, & Yearsley, 
2017). HT posits that we know ideas only indirectly, by how they appear from particular 
perspectives or contexts, but each context unavoidably influences how the idea is experienced 
and understood. The context the creator calls upon at any given instant reflects the current 
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structure of his or her self-organizing internal model of the world, or worldview (Gabora, 1998, 
2017; Gabora & Aerts, 2009). A key principle, to be elaborated shortly, is that during creative 
thought, what may appear to be distinct and separate ideas is in fact different actualizations or 
projections of the same idea considered from different contexts over the course of a creative 
‘honing’ process, akin to different shadows cast by an unseen object when light is shone on it 
from different directions.  
The issue of whether the mental representation of a creative idea is more like a physical 
object subject to search and selection or more like an unseen entity casting projections is not 
merely pedantic, for the formal structure of the two is entirely different (Gabora, 2005; Gabora & 
Aerts, 2007). To explain why, it will be necessary to briefly introduce what has come to be called 
(somewhat unfortunately) the quantum approach to concepts (Aerts, Broekaert, Gabora, & 
Sozzo, 2016b; Aerts, Gabora, & Sozzo, 2013; Blutner, Pothos, & Bruza, 2013; Busemeyer & 
Wang, 2018;; Gabora, 2001; Gabora & Aerts, 2002; Pothos, Busemeyer, Shiffrin, & Yearsley, 
2017). It is called this not because it has anything to do with quantum particles, but because it 
uses generalizations of mathematical structures originally developed for quantum mechanics. 
The motivation and rationale for this approach are provided elsewhere (Aerts & Gabora, 2005; 
Atmanspacher,  Romer, & Wallach, 2006; Bruza, Busemeyer, & Gabora, 2009; Busemeyer & 
Bruza, 2012; Khrennikov, 2010). For now, we note that this research does not aim to reduce 
cognitive psychology to physics, nor is it merely an anology. Rather, much as was the case with 
other branches of mathematics such as geometry and complexity theory, structures originally 
developed for physical sciences were later found to have applications in other domains.  
Although the quantum approach to cognition is not just an analogy, the light-and-shadow 
analogy hinted at earlier can be a helpful as an explanatory aid to introduce the approach. In 
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(Gabora, 2019b), the gist of the new view of creative thought is conveyed by the photograph 
below of woodcuttings with light shining on them from three different directions, yielding three 
differently shaped shadows for each woodcutting: that of a G, an E, and a B (Fig. 1). Consider 
first the upper woodcutting alone. Though each of its shadow is different, they are all projections 
of the same underlying object. We could say that the woodcutting has the potentiality to 
actualize different ways, and to actualize in one of these ways requires an observable or context, 
in this case, light shining from a particular direction. We can view the state of the woodcutting 
when no light is shining on it as its state of full potentiality. Similarly, while it is tempting to 
assume that a bout of creative thought entails the generation of multiple distinct, separate ideas, 
there may be a single underlying mental representation that, like the woodcutting, affords some 
degree of ambiguity in its interpretation. The fact that different sketches of a painting, or 
prototypes of an invention, take different forms when expressed in the physical world, doesn’t 
mean they derive from different underlying ideas. Just as the shadows of the woodcutting are 
projections of one object, the sketches or prototypes may be different articulations of the same 
underlying idea looked at from different perspectives at different stages of a creative honing 
process. Midway through a creative thought process one may have an inkling of an idea but not 
yet know whether, or exactly how, it could work. Because it is ‘half-baked’, it may be more 
vulnerable to interpretation, meaning that it could appear quite different when looked at from a 
different perspective. 
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Fig. 1: Photograph of ambiguous woodcuttings taken from the front cover of ‘Gödel, Escher, 
Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid’ by Douglas Hofstadter (1979). The top ‘trip-let’ (as he calls 
them) is not simply a rotated version of the one below it; it is a different shape. (Used with 
permission.) 
 
Note that the two woodcuttings in Fig. 1 have different shapes, yet they yield the same 
three letters as shadows. To distinguish the shape of the woodcutting above from the 
woodcutting below would require that light be shown on them from still more angles, casting 
shadows that would not look like any actual letters of the alphabet. Similarly, the more complex 
one’s unborn creative idea, the more honing steps that may be required to discern its underlying 
form and whittle it down as needed. Since it has the potential to manifest different ways, we can 
say that it is a state of potentiality. In the quantum approach, this kind of potentiality is described 
as a superposition state. More precisely, a superposition state is one that is indefinite with 
respect to some specific judgment. It is represented by a state vector in a complex Hilbert space, 
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the dimensionality of which is determined by the number of unique elementary considerations. 
Possible outcomes (which play the role of observables in physics) constitute subspaces of this 
vector space. The outcomes are different ways in which the potentiality could be resolved. 
Intuitively, the notion of a superposition state would appear to be well-suited to the 
description of mental representations at intermediate stages of a creative thought process, which 
are often imprecise and ambiguous. The ambiguity of a word or concept is often reduced through 
introduction of another word or concept that provides new contextual information, e.g., given the 
concept TREE you don’t know whether it a deciduous tree (one with leaves) or a coniferous tree 
(one with needles and cones), but in the context CHRISTMAS, your mind likely settles on it 
being a coniferous tree. Each possible context may actualize the potentiality of the concept 
differently, and in the quantum approach these possible actualizations are represented by basis 
states. The actual, existing context is treated as an observable that determines how the concept 
changes in light of this context.1 In the absence of any observable—i.e., when a concept is not 
being viewed from any particular context, or thought about at all—the concept is said to be in a 
ground state. In its ground state there are no properties associated with the concept, but also, 
there are no properties that are, a priori, excluded from it; thus, you could say it is a state of 
infinite potentiality. Conceptual change due to the impact of a context is modeled as a collapse 
 
1  The context may affect the concept by altering the weights of certain properties. (For example, ‘talks’ and ‘lives in 
a cage’ are not considered properties of BIRD but they are considered properties of PET BIRD (Hampton, 1987); 
thus, the context PET is influencing the properties we ascribe to BIRD.) A context can also alter the typicalities of 
certain exemplars. (As a canonical example, GUPPY is not considered a typical exemplar of PET, nor of FISH, 
but it is considered a typical exemplar of PET FISH (Osherson & Smith, 1981).) 
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event, which involves projection of the vector representing the concept in a superposition state to 
one of its basis states (Fig. 2).  
  
Fig 2: A graphical depiction of a vector |Ψñ representing the concept TREE is shown in black. In 
the default context, TREE may be more likely to collapse to projection vector |dñ which 
represents DECIDUOUS TREE (tree with leaves) than to collapse to projection vector |cñ which 
represents CONIFEROUS TREE (tree with needles and cones). This can be seen by the fact that 
subspace a0 is smaller than subspace a1; i.e., a0 is closer to the xy origin than a1. In the context 
CHRISTMAS, shown in blue, the concept TREE is likely to collapse to the orthogonal 
projection vector |cCñ, representing CONIFEROUS TREE, as shown by the fact that b0 is larger 
than b1. (After collapse, the projected vector, |ΨCñ, is the same length as the original due to 
renormalization). 
 
The concept of a ground state is consistent with the sparse, distributed, content-
addressable structure of associative memory, which enables knowledge and memories that are 
relevant to the task at hand to come to mind naturally without search (Gabora, 2010, 2018). The 
notion of searching and selecting implies that the idea was in there all along and one just has to 
find it. However, memory does not work through a verbatim retrieval process; one does not so 
a0 
|dñ 
|cñ 
|cCñ 
|dCñ 
a1 
b0 
  b1 
D 
|ΨCñ 
 
|Ψñ 
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much retrieve an item as reconstruct it. Recalled items are unavoidably altered by what has been 
experienced since encoding, and spontaneously re-assembled in a way that relates to the task at 
hand (Brockmeier, 2010; McClelland, 2011). When remotely related items encoded in 
distributions of neural cell assemblies that only narrowly overlap are evoked simultaneously for 
the first time, the resulting widely sourced ‘reconstruction’ may well be difficult to parse and 
subject to interpretation.  
The quantum approach provides a means to model some of the non-compositional ways 
in which people use concepts—famously said to be the biggest challenge facing cognitive 
science (Fodor, 1998)—by describing them in terms of effects such as superposition (described 
above), as well as entanglement2 and interference3 (Aerts, Gabora, & Sozzo, 2016; Aerts & 
 
2 Entanglement is a phenomenon first encountered in particle physics wherein the state of one entity cannot be 
described independently of the state of another, and any measurement performed on one influences the other. The 
presence of entanglement is detected by way of the violation of Bell’s (1964) inequality, which proves that this 
mutual influence is not due to yet-to-be-identified ‘hidden variables’. One example of entanglement with respect to 
concepts was provided in (Aerts, Gabora, & Sozzo, 2013). They conducted a study in which participants selected the 
best example of ANIMAL from amongst two options, e.g., BEAR and HORSE (A), or TIGER and CAT (A'), the 
best example of ACTS from amongst two options, e.g., GROWLS and WHINNIES (B), or SNORTS and MEOWS 
(B'), and in ‘coincidence experiments’, the best example of ANIMAL ACTS from permutations of the above (AB, 
A'B, AB', or A'B'). They demonstrated that the participants’ responses violated a well-known variant of Bell’s 
inequality (Clauser, Horne, Shimony, & Holt, 1969). 
3 Interacting waves generate patterns of constructive and destructive interference. Destructive interference is the 
annihilation of the crest of one wave by the trough of another, and constructive interference is the opposite, wherein 
crests and troughs are aligned, and amplify each other. The principle can be applied to concepts using data from 
studies involving conjunctions and disjunctions. For example, when people are asked to choose from amongst items 
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Sozzo, 2014; Busemeyer & Bruza, 2012). The approach can been applied not just to concept 
combination but also to more complex compounds of concepts such as decisions (e.g., 
Busemeyer, Wang, & Townsend, 2006; Yukalov & Sornette 2009) jokes (Gabora & Kitto, 
2017), worldviews (Gabora & Aerts, 2009), and creativity (Gabora & Carbert, 2015). In creative 
thought, however, context does not necessarily reduce ambiguity, because (as noted above) the 
relationship between the original concept and the context may be remote, which may introduce 
ambiguity. For example, at the instant that Piero Gatti and colleagues first conceived of a 
beanbag chair, the context BEANBAG reduced ambiguity by constraining what kind of chair 
they would make, but it also introduced ambiguity, i.e., about whether such a chair would need 
legs, what kinds of beans to use, and so forth. As they thought it through they came up with 
different prototypes. However, in our view these prototypes were not independent entities; they 
were different manifestations of an evolving (where the term ‘evolving’ is used not as it is in 
biology but as it is in physics to refer to a dynamic process) mental representation of the 
‘beanbag chair’ idea, which can be modeled as projections into different subspaces. Honing the 
idea is modeled as reiterated collapse, resulting in a change of state of the idea, which induces 
the creator to subject the idea to a new context, which brings about another collapse, and so 
 
such as COCONUT, ALMOND, and ACORN, which are good examples of FRUITS, good examples of 
VEGETABLES, and good examples of the disjunction FRUITS OR VEGETABLES, for some items the disjunction 
is chosen too often (overextension) while for others it is chosen too seldom (underextension) (Hampton, 1988). 
Plotting this pattern of overextension and underextension generated a distinctive pattern of constructive and 
destructive interference (Aerts, Broekaert, Gabora, & Sozzo, 2016). 
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forth, until the idea is sufficiently robust in the face of new contexts that it no longer undergoes 
change of state (Gabora, 2017). 
 An implication of HT that arises from the notion of ground state is that when an idea is 
not the subject of conscious attention—e.g., during incubation—it exists in a state of full 
potentiality in which no property is definitively present or absent. The context in which it comes 
to mind actualizes some properties and annihilates others. For a given property, there exists some 
possible context that could actualize (or annihilate) it, making it present (or absent). For 
example, although the property ‘surrounded by water’ would appear to be a defining property of 
the concept ISLAND, in the context KITCHEN—i.e., the concept combination KITCHEN 
ISLAND—that seemingly defining property is absent. On the other hand, other properties that 
are not usually true for ISLAND, such as ‘found in a house’ are true for KITCHEN ISLAND. It 
is in this sense that no mental content is a priori excluded; everything encoded in memory is fair 
game. That does not mean there are no constraints; in this case, for example, the context 
KITCHEN constrains which possible properties of ISLAND are present (or ‘actualized’) and 
which are not. Thus, unlikely properties are not ruled out a priori, they exist as possibilities, and 
conversely, seemingly defining properties are not ‘ruled in’, and it is this aspect of HT that 
makes it uniquely able it to explain how remote associates ‘shake hands’. 
1.3 Rationale for Current Studies 
We have seen that while conventional theories predict that midway through a creative 
process one is searching and/or selecting from amongst multiple candidate ideas, HT predicts 
that one is modifying a single ambiguous representation that amalgamates components from 
different sources by viewing different context-specific articulations of it. This paper presents two 
studies that test between these theories. Study 1 presents an experiment with a close-ended 
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analogy problem-solving task.4 One might suppose that because analogy does not (in general) 
require that one come up with novel information so much as connect a source in memory to a 
structurally similar target, it is the creative process most likely to involve search and selection. 
Thus, if we can show that even analogy problem solving involves not search or selection 
amongst predefined alternatives but the honing of an ill-defined mental representation, we have 
compelling evidence for the hypothesis that honing figures prominently in this creative process.  
Since it was not obvious that the state of half-baked creative ideas in one task would have 
anything in common with the state of half-baked creative ideas in another task, Study 2 presents 
an experiment conducted with an open-ended art-making task.5 
2. Study 1 
2.1. Background: Contrasting the Predictions of Structure Mapping versus Honing Theory 
SM and HT give different predictions as to the state of the mind midway through analogy 
formation (as schematically illustrated in Fig. 3). The two theories give identical predictions 
regarding the form of completed analogies; it is only for incomplete analogies that they give 
different predictions. Therefore, we used an existing procedure that involves interrupting 
participants midway through a problem-solving session and asking them what they are thinking 
(Bowers, Farvolden, & Mermigis, 1995), and adapted it to an analogy problem-solving task. 
  Structure Mapping  Honing Theory 
 
4  An early draft of this study was presented in a conference proceedings paper (Gabora & Saab, 2011). 
5  An early draft of this study was presented in a conference proceedings paper (Carbert, Gabora, Schwartz, & Ranjan, 
2014). 
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Early in 
Analogy 
Formation 
Process  Sources     Target   Source       Target 
Late in 
Analogy 
Formation 
Process  Source       Target   Source       Target  
Completion 
of Analogy 
 Source       Target            Source       Target 
 
Fig. 3. A simplified illustration of the relevant differences between analogy solving by structure 
mapping versus honing theory. (See text for details.) 
 
SM predicts that early in the analogy formation process, the analogist searches their mind 
for content matches from different sources. The matches are combined into structurally aligned, 
yet distinct, clusters (Fig. 3, top left). The analogist then selects the most structurally consistent 
cluster for mapping. Candidate inferences are projected sequentially (represented by two 
arrows), and the analogist evaluates the entire mapping after projecting all inferences. Upon 
reaching a correct solution, the problem solver has mapped and verified all three inferences 
(three arrows). Midway through analogy solving, participants are thought to be comparing 
different clusters and thus could write down multiple separate possibilities. In the case of 
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structure mapping, there is no reason to expect that the incomplete solution will contain extra 
material. 
According to HT, the mental representation is composed of multiple associated domains 
that share features (Fig. 3, top-right). By considering the idea from multiple perspectives, some 
correspondences will be mapped; unmappable ones will be deemed irrelevant for the current 
problem (two mapped arrows and one unmapped. By disambiguating the relevant from the 
irrelevant, the analogist knows what to exclude to reach the final well-defined solution (three 
arrows). Therefore, HT predicts that midway through the task, multiple possibilities may be 
given as an incomplete solution that will contain extraneous details. We hypothesize that midway 
through a creative task, the majority of participants will give responses that will be categorized 
as consistent with these predictions of HT. 
2.2. Method 
2.2.1. Participants. Eighty-five University of British Columbia undergraduates enrolled 
in psychology courses were recruited using an online study recruitment system (SONA). An 
additional six students participated as judges who evaluated the responses to the analogy task. 
(The sample size was simply the number of participants who signed up for the study.) They 
received course credit for their participation. All procedures were approved by the UBC Ethics 
Board. 
2.2.2. Materials. The source and target used in this study were a pair of stories which  
are commonly used in the analogy literature (Gick & Holyoak, 1983). The source, titled ‘The 
General’, involves a fortress that cannot be captured if all soldiers come from the same direction 
but that can be successfully captured by dividing the army into small groups of soldiers that 
converge on the fortress from multiple directions (Appendix A).  The target, titled ‘The 
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Radiation Problem’, involves finding a way to destroy a tumor without killing surrounding tissue 
(Appendix B).  The solution to The Radiation Problem is analogous to the solution to The 
General; the tumor is destroyed using multiple low-intensity X-rays from different directions.  
2.2.3. Procedure. In the  exposure-to-source phase, the participants were given five 
minutes to study The General. They were then asked to summarize the story as a test of their 
story comprehension. In the problem-solving phase, the participants were presented with the 
target, The Radiation Problem. They were given no indication that the story from phase one 
could help them solve the problem. Since pilot studies showed that the minimum time required to 
solve The Radiation Problem was two minutes, participants were interrupted after 100 seconds 
and told they had 20 seconds to write down whatever they were currently thinking in terms of a 
solution. Since two minutes was the minimum time to solve and not the average, the 100-second 
mark was deemed an appropriate time to interject. In a questionnaire distributed immediately 
afterward, they were asked whether they noticed a relation between The General and The 
Radiation Problem, and if so, at what point they noticed it. 
2.2.4. Judging. Results of both phases were assessed by six judges who were naïve as to 
the theoretical rationale for the study. The story summaries produced in phase one were judged 
for comprehension on a three-point scale: poor, fair, or good. 
Since we were interested in the nature of cognitive states midway through a creative 
process, participants who correctly solved the problem in the allotted time were removed from 
the analysis (n = 34). They were deemed to have correctly solved the problem if they included all 
three of the correspondences provided in Table 1. 
Note that since we were not interested in the end product, but in the mental representation 
of an idea prior to arriving at a solution, we did not evaluate the creativity of participants’ 
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responses. 
 
Table 1 
The Necessary Correspondences for a Complete Analogical Solution 
The General (Source) The Radiation Problem (Target) 
1. Soldiers separated into groups 1. Multiple rays 
2. Each group is small in size 2. Low intensity 
3. Groups converge from different directions 3. Rays converge from different directions 
 
The judges were asked to categorize each of the remaining incomplete solutions as either 
structure mapping (SM) or honing theory (HT) according to the characteristics of each provided 
in Table 2. Judges were not asked to note whether criteria 1 and/or 2 were satisfied, and were 
only given SM and HT as options to choose between. (It was possible for an answer to contain 
elements predicted by both theories; for example it might contain multiple solutions separated by 
the word ‘or’ (indicative of SM), as well as extra information that would be relevant for related 
problems but that was not relevant for the one at hand (indicative of HT). However, using 
multiple judges all responses ended up categorized as one or the other.) 
 
Table 2 
Characteristics Used to Judge Incomplete Analogy Solutions as Structure Mapping (SM) versus 
Honing Theory (HT) 
Structure Mapping (SM) Honing Theory (HT) 
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1. If multiple solutions are given they are 
considered separate and distinct (for 
example, separated by the word ‘or’)   
1. If multiple solutions are given they are 
jumbled together   
2. Does not contain extra, irrelevant 
information 
2. Contains extra information that would be 
relevant for related problems but that is not 
relevant for this one 
 
A potential concern at this point is that an answer might contain extraneous information 
because it was elaborated following retrieval, rather than because the mental representation was 
ill-defined and consisted of multiple merged components. There is evidence that analogy making 
does in some cases involve adapting or elaborating the source to improve the match (Ross, 
1987). SM assumes the analogy-solving process may involve generating and mapping more 
correspondences to extend the analogy after the three stages have been performed (Forbus, 
Gentner, & Law, 1995; Gentner & Markman, 1997), whereas HT argues that analogy-solving 
proceeds by weeding out non-correspondences that appear in the initial conception.  
 However, in the analogy used here, no adaptation or elaboration of the source was 
needed to obtain the complete and correct solution. In other words, the correct source (The 
General) could be used as is, without elaboration. Therefore, if extraneous information is present, 
we have good reason to believe that it was due to the presence of merged components. 
An example of an answer that was categorized as SM is:  
No idea. Don’t know much about science. Maybe try to have a low-intensity ray 
that would sufficiently kill the tumor but not destroy healthy tissues. 
In this answer, one of correspondences has been mapped (correspondence 2: low 
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intensity ray). Since the other two correspondences were not  mapped (multiple rays and 
different directions) the solution is incomplete. Since the answer contains no extraneous material, 
and because it provides no evidence that the participant’s current conception of a solution 
consists of multiple items jumbled together in memory, it was classified as SM. 
An example of an answer that was categorized as HT is: 
The high intensity ray is necessary to kill the tumor so maybe shooting it in short 
successive bursts from different angles will kill the tumor without killing too much 
healthy tissue. 
In this incomplete solution, one of the correspondences has been mapped: different 
directions (correspondence 3). It was classified as HT because it includes irrelevant information 
(the notion of ‘short successive bursts’) activated by the target that is unnecessary to arrive at the 
correct solution. 
2.3. Results 
Analysis of Cohen’s kappa between each pair of raters showed that one judge had poor 
agreement with all others on the ratings of story comprehension (κ ≤ 0.11), and another judge 
had poor agreement with all others on the ratings of the incomplete solutions (κ ≤ 0.18); 
therefore, the ratings from these judges were removed. An average of the kappa coefficient for 
each rater pair of the remaining five judges was calculated (Hallgren, 2012; Light, 1971) and 
showed fair agreement between the five judges for both ratings of story comprehension (κ = 
0.38), and ratings of the incomplete solutions (κ = 0.34; Landis & Koch, 1977). Thirty-six 
participants responded that they saw a relation between the story and the problem, and 15 said 
they did not. Pearson’s chi-squared test showed that there was no relationship between the 
categorization of a participants’ story comprehension and the categorization of their incomplete 
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solution, χ2(2) = 0.64, p = .72. There were two cells with expected frequencies less than five, but 
collapsing ‘fair’ and ‘good’ ratings showed a similar, nonsignificant result, χ2(1) = 0.22, p = .63. 
This indicates that the theory supported by a given response was not dependent on the level of 
the participant’s story comprehension. 
Each of the 51 incomplete solutions (those that remained after complete solutions were 
removed from the analysis) was classified as supportive of structure mapping if three or more 
judges judged it as type ‘SM’, and as supportive of honing theory if three or more judges judged 
it as type ‘HT’. The odd number of judges meant that no cases were tied. 39 were classified as 
supportive of honing theory and 12 as supportive of structure mapping (Fig. 4). A one-sample 
chi-square test was significant, χ2(1) = 14.29, p < .001. Thus, the frequency count data more 
strongly support the predictions of Honing Theory than Structure Mapping.  
 
Fig. 4. Frequency of Solution Judgments for Honing Theory (n = 39) and Structure Mapping (n 
= 12). 
A further analysis compared the mean number of judgments (out of a maximum of five, 
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the total number of judges) that supported each theory across all 51 responses. The mean number 
of SM judgments was 1.37 (SD = 1.55), and the mean number of HT judgments was 3.65 (SD = 
1.56). A paired-sample t test showed that the difference was moderate and significant t(50) = 
5.23, p < .001, d = 0.66. Thus, these data corroborate the above frequency count findings.  
2.4. Discussion 
Both the data from frequency counts and mean number of SM versus HT judgments are 
more consistent with the predictions of HT than SM, suggesting that HT more accurately 
describes the state of the mental representation of an analogy midway through the creative 
process. We note that different elements of the base analog were incorporated in different ways 
in different participants’ answers, which shows that lack of a correct answer was not merely a 
problem of retrieval but of how to use the retrieved information. We reiterate that we were not 
assessing how creative the responses were, nor participants’ success in carrying out the 
analogies, but rather the form of the mental representations involved. 
We note that HT is not inconsistent with the notions of structural alignment and mapping, 
but merely SM’s treatment of candidate structures as discrete and separate entities. The fact that 
a minority of participants’ answers were judged as SS suggests that both theories capture some 
aspects of the underlying psychology, but that honing theory better captures the mental 
representation of an incomplete analogy.  
We now turn to a study that investigated the state of half-baked creative ideas in an open-
ended art-making task. 
3. Study 2 
3.1. Background 
Study 1 provided an initial source of evidence that the mental representation of an idea 
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midway through the creative process consists not of multiple, discrete possibilities, but a single 
structure with multiple merged components. However, analogy problem solving is a highly 
constrained task with a single correct solution, and one could argue that this is uncharacteristic of 
most creative tasks. Moreover, it has been argued that classic insight problems such as this 
divorce the task from the solver’s real-world context because they do not require interaction with 
an object (Vallée-Tourangeau, Steffensen, Vallée-Tourangeau, and Sirota, 2016). The goal of 
Study 2 was to test this hypothesis using a less constrained, open-ended task. 
Art-making is an ‘ill-defined’ creative task (Sawyer, 2018). Even if multiple artists are 
given the same prompt, they will reach vastly different ‘solutions’ (e.g., a painting they are 
satisfied with). The target state is not fixed as it was in Study 1. No matter how well-defined an 
artist’s conception of the painting may become through the art-making process, the open-ended, 
subjective nature of the goal state makes art a viable domain for a less constrained creative task.  
As with the analogy-solving task, SS theories and HT make different predictions about 
the mental representation of artists’ conceptions of their work midway through an art-making 
task. The SS approach used by the conventional BVSR theory predicts that the artist is searching 
for and selecting from amongst multiple, separate, distinct ideas about their painting, selecting 
the best for refinement, and discarding the rest. They may overlap considerably in their 
components but they are not the same entity (much as two people both have a mouth, nose, and 
so forth, but they are different people). For example, Simonton treats Picasso’s Guernica 
sketches as discrete idea variants which Picasso blindly creates and then chooses from to pursue 
further; these selections lead him towards the finished product in a nonmonotonic fashion but 
allow him to cleanly backtrack to earlier variants (Simonton, 2007). The artist’s ideas, like the 
sketches of different parts of the painting, are considered separate from one another, lack a core 
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vision guiding the process, and do not result in emergent self-understanding or internal 
transformation. 
Honing theory predicts that if multiple idea components are contributing to the artwork, 
they are retrieved on the basis of activated attributes and in an amalgamated and indistinct form. 
Contrary to the SS approach, components are not isolated in the mind, and each new mental 
action changes, however subtly, the mental representation as a whole—even if there is no 
noticeable difference in the painting or any preliminary sketches—such that, after deciding to 
exclude the sun the artist has previously imagined, he or she advances to a conception of the 
painting that is, again, sunless, but only in the context of having considered and rejected the sun 
component (Gabora, 2005). We believe it is by this reasoning, not by backtracking, that 
additional idea components emerge out of earlier ones. Since the components are connected to 
the same representation, each should contain emergent properties of a core idea the artist has in 
mind. Honing such a multifaceted construct should also lead to greater self-understanding and 
internal transformation because the combination of concepts is novel. 
We hypothesized that HT will more accurately predict the state of mental representations 
midway through the subjective painting task, i.e., ideas are predicted to be ill-defined, jumbled 
together, and to contain emergent properties of a common core idea that facilitate self-
understanding and internal transformation in the majority of the artists’ responses. 
3.2. Method 
3.2.1. Participants. The participants were undergraduate students enrolled in psychology 
courses at the University of British Columbia who received course credit for participating. There 
were two types of participants: 56 who created paintings and answered questionnaires, who will 
be referred to as artists, and six who judged the artists’ answers to the questionnaires, who will 
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be referred to as judges. All participants were naïve concerning the rationale for the study. As in 
the first study, they received course credit for their participation, and all procedures were 
approved by the UBC Ethics Board.  
3.2.2. Materials and Procedure for Artists. Between two and eight artists participated 
at a time. They were seated at desks placed in a large circle, with each individual facing 
outwards such that they could not see each other’s art. Each artist’s desk had paintbrushes of two 
different sizes and an ice cube tray containing seven different colors of acrylic paint (pink, white, 
yellow, green, brown, blue, and red). Each desk also had a glass of water and two pieces of paper 
towel for cleaning the paintbrushes, and a plastic plate for mixing colors. Additionally, on the 
desk were a set of ten Crayola washable watercolor paints in plastic jars, pencil crayon pastels, 
chalk pastels, oil pastels, a piece of watercolor paper, and a piece of paper for acrylic paints.  
Each artist was also provided with a handout that said: ‘Create a painting that expresses 
yourself in any style that appeals to you’. They were told that their artwork would not be judged 
in any way, nor photographed, and that only their responses to questions about the art-making 
process would be analyzed. They were told that the study was concerned with peoples’ 
perceptions of the creative process of art-making. They had the option to pick up their painting at 
the end of the semester; otherwise, it was destroyed after one year.  
Before beginning to paint, participants were given a form that asked, ‘What are you 
thinking in terms of what your painting will look like? Write down your thoughts about your 
painting in as much detail as you can’. They were told to start painting as soon as they finished 
writing. After 15 minutes, they were interrupted and given another form that said, ‘Write down 
your thoughts about the painting in as much detail as you can’. After they finished responding, 
they were asked to continue painting until they were finished or the time was up, whichever 
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came first. At this point they were given a final form with 15 questions that said, ‘Were all of 
your ideas for your painting distinct and separate ideas?’ In a pilot study with 15 participants, 
there was an additional question: ‘Do you think being interrupted affected how you carried out 
your painting?’ Since all of the participants answered ‘no’ to this question it was omitted 
thereafter. (Had any of them answered ‘yes’ their data would have been omitted from the 
analysis and we would have continued asking this question of subsequent participants.) All 
participants completed the procedure within ninety minutes.  
Wince we were interested in the states of mental representations, not in the artistic merit 
of the paintings, we did not use Creativity Self-Assessments in this study. 
3.2.3. Judging. As in the analogy task, naïve judges assessed the artists’ questionnaire 
responses. The judges did not see or evaluate any of the artworks; all they saw were the artists’ 
questionnaire responses. Each judge was provided with a set of handouts. One handout included 
a set of criteria to classify artists’ answers as indicative of one theory or the other (Appendix C), 
while a second handout included examples of the kinds of responses they may see, and how they 
should be coded. The judging criteria handout also contained a summary of differences between 
the two theories, provided in Table 3. The judges were told that a flat-out ‘yes’ to ‘Were all of 
your ideas for your painting distinct and separate ideas?’ was indicative of S and a flat-out ‘no’ 
was indicative of H. The judges were also told that for the question ‘Was there ever a state in 
your art-making process where your conception of the painting felt “half-baked”?’ a flat-out 
‘yes’ was indicative of H, and a flat-out ‘no’ was indicative of S.  
The judges were given the 56 questionnaires and a form on which to classify the artists’ 
answers as indicative of either H or S. We told them, ‘If you are not sure just go with your gut 
feeling’. 
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Table 3 
Characteristics Used to Judge Responses as Search and Select (S) versus Honing Theory (H) 
 S H 
If multiple ideas are given, 
they are 
Distinct (e.g., complete 
ideas separated by ‘or’) 
Jumbled together (e.g., idea 
fragments spliced together) 
Ideas are  Well-defined; need to be 
tweaked/mutated and 
selected amongst 
Ill-defined; need to be made 
concrete; later elements 
emerge from earlier ones 
Common core to ideas? Never Yes, or sometimes 
Emergent properties of 
painting? 
No Yes 
Emergent self-
understanding? 
No Yes 
Emphasis External product Internal transformation 
 
3.3. Results 
Agreement between the judges was calculated using an average kappa value from all the 
rater pairs, as in Study 1 (Hallgren, 2012; Light, 1971). For several questions there was poor 
agreement between raters, indicating that the judges may have had difficulty distinguishing 
between the predictions of the two theories. On the basis of the judges’ level of agreement and 
the clarity of the questions, two questions were selected for analysis. The first was referred to as 
Question 1: ‘Were all of your ideas for your painting distinct and separate ideas?’ It had fair 
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inter-judge agreement (κ = 0.29, n = 55; Landis & Koch, 1977). An example of a response to this 
question that was categorized as S is: ‘Yes, they all required their own time and dedication to 
come together as one piece’. Another example is: ‘Yes, I had several ideas which could have 
formulated into a drawing if I had chosen to pursue any one. I’m not sure why I chose the 
sunset’. An example from the same question that was coded as H is: ‘No, they were about me. I 
put on a lot of masks and hide behind colours’. A second example is: ‘No, the ideas flowed off of 
each other… filled in spaces that needed to be filled… if I liked one colour, I’d use it more often 
in another area of the page’. The second was referred to as Question 2: ‘Was there ever a state in 
your art-making process where your conception of the painting felt “half-baked”?’ It had fair 
agreement (κ = .35, n = 47). An example of a response to this question that was categorized as H 
is: ‘Yes, initially when the sky was not painted, the painting felt “empty”. This inspired the idea 
to paint the background’. An example coded as S is: ‘Nope not really! I had a pretty good idea of 
what I wanted to paint’. Not all artists answered every question, and there were a few instances 
where a judge missed coding a response. One judge had poor agreement with the other judges, 
and removing this judge improved reliability for all but one question, so this judge was removed 
from the analysis. This improved agreement for Question 1 (κ = 0.33; fair agreement) and 
Question 2 (κ = .51; moderate agreement). Kappa values for all questions are displayed in Table 
4. 
Table 4 
Light’s Kappa for Six Judges (κ6judges) and Five Judges (κ5judges). Analyzed Questions in Bold.  
Question κ6judges(nartists) κ5judges(nartists)  
Pre-painting   
1. What are you thinking in terms of what your painting will 0.17 (56) 0.20 (56) 
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look like? 
2. Write down your thoughts about the painting in as much 
detail as you can. 
0.06 (55) 0.08 (55) 
Midway   
1. Write down your thoughts about the painting in as much 
detail as you can. 
0.08 (29) 0.09 (29) 
Post-painting   
1. Write down your thoughts about the painting in as much 
detail as you can. 
0.09 (53) 0.11 (54) 
2. When you read the instructions, what ideas came to mind? 0.11 (52) 0.16 (52) 
3. What best describes the state of your mind when you first 
saw the directions? 
-0.02 (38) 0.02 (38) 
4. Try to describe how you came up with what you painted. 0.10 (56) 0.14 (56) 
5. Was there a point when you started to feel like your painting 
was coming together? If so, please explain. 
0.03 (55) 0.03 (55) 
6. What did if feel like when your painting started coming 
together? 
-0.02 (43) -0.00 (43) 
7. Did your painting come together? 0.09 (55) 0.14 (56) 
8. Did your ideas for your painting all share the same core 
idea? 
0.21 (55) 0.15 (56) 
9. Were all of your ideas for your painting distinct and 
separate ideas? (Question 1) 
0.29 (55) 0.33 (55) 
10. Do you think that you had complete and whole ideas that 0.15 (55) 0.28 (56) 
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you did not paint? 
11. Did you ever have multiple ideas about how to do a certain 
part of the painting and then make multiple sketches of that 
certain portion of the painting? (Yes or No) 
0.84 (51) 0.88 (54) 
12. If you answered ‘yes’ to the previous question then please 
answer the following question: Did the creation of one sketch 
or a certain part of the painting affect how you went about 
creating the next sketch for the same part of the painting? 
0.03 (8) 0.07 (15) 
13. Was there ever a state in your art-making process 
where your conception of the painting felt ‘half-baked’? 
(Question 2) 
0.35 (47) 0.51 (47) 
14. Does your final painting look like you thought it would? 
Please explain your answer. 
0.10 (50) 0.17 (50) 
15. Is there any sense in which you emerged from the painting 
with a better understanding of yourself? If so, please explain. 
0.12 (46) 0.18 (47) 
16. Were you in any way transformed by the art-making 
process? If so, please explain. 
0.15 (27) 0.17 (29) 
Note. Judge 2 missed coding a few responses, which is why nartists increases for some rows. 
The artists’ responses were classified as supporting HT if three or more of the five judges 
judged it as type H, and as supporting a conventional search and select theory if three or more 
judges judged it as S. 
For Question 1, 39 of the artist responses were classified by the judges as supporting of 
theory H, and 16 were classified as supporting theory S (Fig. 5). A one-sample chi-square test 
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revealed a statistically significant difference between the classifications for theory H and S, χ2(1) 
= 9.62, p = .002. For Question 2, 40 responses were coded in favor of theory H, while 12 were 
classified as supportive of theory S. A one-sample chi-square test showed that this difference 
was significant, χ2(1) = 15.01, p < .001.  Thus, the frequency counts are more consistent with the 
predictions of HT. 
 
Fig. 5. Frequency of judgments of Honing Theory versus conventional Search and Select Theory 
for questions 1 and 2. 
We then compared the mean number of judgments (out of a maximum of five, the total 
number of judges) across all responses that supported each theory. Taking the mean across all 55 
responses for Question 1, the mean number of S judgments was 1.62 (SD = 1.59), and the mean 
number of H judgments was 3.38 (SD = 1.59). A paired-sample t test showed that the difference 
was significant and the effect size was moderate, t(54) = 4.11, p < .001, d = 0.56. For Question 2, 
the mean number of S judgments was 1.53 (SD = 1.74), and the mean number of H judgments 
was 3.36 (SD = 1.72). A paired-sample t test showed that the difference was significant and had a 
moderate effect size, t(51) = 3.82, p < .001, d = 0.55. Thus, these data corroborate the above 
frequency count findings.  
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3.4. Discussion 
This study investigated the form of a creative idea midway through an open-ended art 
making task. As predicted by HT, the majority of participants considered their ideas about their 
painting ill-defined and inseparable from one another. This provides tentative support the 
hypothesis that midway through the creative process one is working with, not a collection of 
discrete candidates, but an ill-defined mental representation with the potentiality to manifest as 
different concrete outputs. Because of low agreement between judges, the questions regarding 
whether the art-making process facilitated emergent properties, self-understanding, and internal 
transformation remain unanswered.  
 4. General Discussion 
This work contributes to our understanding of creative cognition by shedding light on the 
form ideas take during the creative process. We carried out two studies to investigate the mental 
representation of an unfinished idea. The first study showed that midway through an analogy 
problem the mental representation of the solution appears to take the form of, not a collection of 
independent solutions from amongst which one is selected for mapping, but rather, a 
conglomerate of potentially widely-sourced elements, as predicted by the honing theory of 
creativity (HT). The second study came to a similar conclusion using an open-ended art-making 
task. The results of both studies were in greater agreement with the predictions of HT over SS. 
They provide tentative support for the hypothesis that unborn ideas exist in a form that can be 
described as a superposition state.  
There are many aspects of established theories of creativity—including the two 
mentioned in the introduction—that are not invalidated by these findings; indeed, elements of 
HT such as ground state and superposition state could be incorporated into BVSR or SM. One 
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implication of these findings, however, and in particular their support for the ‘incomplete idea as 
superposition state’ hypothesis, is that they call into question the well-entrenched view that 
creativity involves two distinct forms of thought, alternately referred to as convergent versus 
divergent (e.g., Guilford 1967), generative versus exploratory (e.g., Finke, Ward, & Smith, 
1992), associative versus analytic (e.g., Gabora, 2010), or executive versus generative (e.g., 
Ellamil, Dobson, Beeman, & Christoff, 2012).6 As the creator starts to converge on a way of 
portraying the unborn idea that best communicates it to its intended audience, this may appear to 
entail a shift to a new and different kind of mental processing, i.e., from ‘generating many’ 
possible mental representations of the idea to ‘refining one’. However, the real situation may be 
much as if one went from shining light on an object from different directions—generating 
multiple shadows—to shining light on it from similar directions—making minor tweaks on the 
‘same’ shadow. There is just one entity casting shadows, and just one process: the process of 
shining a light and casting shadows. Our results are consistent with the proposal that in creative 
cognition there is just one representation of the unborn idea, modeled as a superposition state, 
and one process: nudging it closer to its final form by looking at it in different ways, which can 
be modeled by projecting it into different subspaces. The mental content of creative thought may 
be more vulnerable to manifesting as seemingly independent ideas because due to its ambiguity, 
there are more ways to think about (i.e., project) it. As you think through the creative idea, the 
considerations you subject it to (the contexts) start to converge, which could be modeled as the 
 
6  See (Sowden et al., 2014) for how the two forms of thought discussed in the creativity literature relate to other dual 
process theories. Indeed, the view proposed here also challenges dual process theories of cognition outside of the 
creativity literature.  
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subspaces becoming more aligned, such that the rotation required to change from one evaluation 
basis to the next becomes smaller.7 Thus, external manifestations of the creative process (i.e., 
design prototypes, or sketches made prior to the final painting) come to appear less like different 
ideas and more like variants on one increasingly well-defined idea. The mechanics of this 
shifting between what are conventionally construed as different modes of thought has been 
explored mathematically with a simple model of how the set of exemplars of a concept 
entertained is affected by a threshold of allowable deviation from the default context (Veloz, 
Gabora, Eyjolfson, & Aerts, 2011). The concept (HAT) is represented by a state vector that is a 
superposition of its possible exemplars (COWBOY HAT, etc.). Inserting data from a study in 
which participants were asked to rate the typicality of these different exemplars of a concept for 
different contexts (e.g., ‘worn to be funny’), we showed how, by raising or lowering this 
threshold, the typicality of exemplars entertained increases or decreases. This suggests that the 
apparent transition from a divergent to a convergent mode of thought may be an artifact of 
viewing the idea from increasingly similar contexts. This view of creativity is consistent with 
research on artists and designers which suggest that creative ideation involves transforming a 
‘kernel idea’ which goes from ill-defined to well-defined through an interaction between artist 
and artwork (Locher, 2010; Mace & Ward, 2002; Sawyer, 2018; Tovey, Porter, & Newman, 
2003; Weisberg, 2004). Experiments on concept combination (summarized in Ward & 
Kolomytz, 2010) have shown that the more dissimilar the contributing concepts, the more 
original (though potentially less practical) the resulting idea. This suggests that the more 
 
7  We might interpret this as reduced incompatibility of the considerations the idea is subjected to, such that the 
projectors are more nearly commutative (see Wang & Busemeyer, 2015). 
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dissimilar the ‘raw ingredients’ of an idea, the more honing it may require, and the more 
superposition states it must pass through to become viable. 
This is the first set of studies we know of to use this ‘interrupt midway through creative 
task’ procedure, and as with all new experimental protocols, it has several limitations. The 
results could be affected by the introspective ability and eloquence of the participants. Mental 
states—and particularly, those concerning ideas that are not completely worked out—can be 
difficult to access and articulate, and experimental methods for studying introspection are 
underdeveloped (Ziegler & Weger, 2018). It could be that in the process of expressing their 
mental states verbally, SS mental states come out sounding like HT mental states, or vice versa. 
Since the results are quite strong and since this could work either for or against our hypothesis, 
we doubt that it would change the outcome, but it cannot be ruled out. Another limitation is that 
participants were disrupted at a particular point in time, and if they had been disrupted at a 
different point along the timeline, this could have influenced the relative degree of support 
obtained for the two theories. However, the window of opportunity to interrupt them was narrow, 
particularly for Study 1, since they required sufficient time to understand what the problem was 
and get an idea of how to approach it, but not so much time as to solve it.  
 There are also ways in which future studies could improve upon or develop further the 
methods used here. In future studies along the lines of Study 1, we suggest that providing judges 
with a ‘neither theory’ option would allow them greater flexibility. It could also be useful to 
incorporate a think-aloud procedure in addition to questionnaires, in order to capture the 
progression of ideas when working through a creative or problem-solving task (e.g., Pringle & 
Sowden, 2017). Both studies were somewhat limited by small sample size. Study 2 was limited 
by the difficulty the judges had in consistently rating the open-ended questions, which could be 
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addressed by using more closed-ended questions, especially during the midway interruption. 
Future studies should improve the sample answers provided to train the judges, as we supplied 
seven of the sixteen questions, including the two chosen for analysis, with ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers. 
We believe these two changes would increase agreement between the judges. As with Study 1, 
more categories could have been offered to the judges, such as ‘neither’ or ‘both, to some 
degree’. In addition, in future studies, a broader range of tasks could be used. Future studies 
could also expand on the types of questions and carry out extensive pilot studies to assess their 
inter-rater reliability. All questions used were designed specifically for this study, and thus had 
not been previously tested for clarity or coding of responses.  
Other possibilities for future studies involves testing for quantum effects in other ways. 
One such direction arises out of research in which decision making is modeled as collapse, i.e., 
projection of a state vector in a superposition state onto a subspace (e.g., Aerts & Aerts, 1995; 
Busemeyer & Bruza, 2012; Pothos & Busemeyer, 2009). This line of work has demonstrated the 
presence of asymmetries and order effects, as predicted by quantum theory (Aerts & Bianchi, 
2017; Pothos, Busemeyer, & Trueblood, 2013). This may be relevant to creative cognition, since 
creativity involves making decisions. For example, prior to deciding what colour of paint to use 
next in a nonrepresentational piece of abstract art, it is not the case that the creator was ‘lacking 
information’ about what paint color came next, i.e., the decision did not involve a simple read-
out from a pre-existing definite state. The decision was made on the fly given other constraints 
(such as, perhaps, the previously used paint colour, and/or the desired mood of the painting). By 
probing participants to make a decision or formulate an impression regarding some aspect of 
their creative work, and assessing the effect of that decision on subsequent cognitive processing 
along the lines of White, Pothos, and Busemeyer (2014), perhaps interrupting participants more 
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than once, it may be possible to investigate whether creative cognition exhibits asymmetries and 
order effects. 
 We conclude by noting that much of human thought, not just creative thought, involves 
the resolution of ambiguity; thus, this work may have implications that extend beyond creativity. 
Nevertheless, we suspest that creative cognition may entail a unique ‘secret sauce,’ i.e., that it 
involves not just superposition but also, entanglement, and as discussed in Footnote 1, entangled 
states have been identified in cognition (through a nontrivial process). Studies are underway to 
assess whether concept combinations that meet the criterion for entangled states are perceived as 
more creative (Hinke & Gabora, in progress).  
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Appendix A 
The following story, referred to as The General, was used as the analogy source in Study One:  
A small country was ruled from a strong fortress by a dictator. The fortress was situated in the 
middle of the country, surrounded by farms and villages. Many roads led to the fortress through 
the countryside. A rebel general vowed to capture the fortress. The general knew that an attack 
by his entire army would capture the fortress. He gathered his army at the head of one of the 
roads, ready to launch a full-scale direct attack. However, the general then learned that the 
dictator had planted mines on each of the roads. The mines were set so that small bodies of men 
could pass over them safely, since the dictator needed to move his troops and workers to and 
from the fortress. However, any large force would detonate the mines. Not only would this blow 
up the road, but it would also destroy many neighboring villages. It therefore seemed impossible 
to capture the fortress. However, the general devised a simple plan. He divided his army into 
small groups and dispatched each group to the head of a different road. When all was ready he 
gave the signal and each group marched down a different road. Each group continued down its 
road to the fortress so that the entire army arrived together at the fortress at the same time. In this 
way, the general captured the fortress and overthrew the dictator. 
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Appendix B 
The following story, referred to as The Radiation Problem, was used as the analogy target in 
Study One: 
Suppose you are a doctor faced with a patient who has a malignant tumor in his stomach. It is 
impossible to operate on the patient, but unless the tumor is destroyed the patient will die. There 
is a kind of ray that can be used to destroy the tumor. If the rays reach the tumor all at once at a 
sufficiently high intensity, the tumor will be destroyed. Unfortunately, at this intensity the 
healthy tissue that the rays pass through on the way to the tumor will also be destroyed. At lower 
intensities the rays are harmless to healthy tissue, but they will not affect the tumor either. What 
type of procedure might be used to destroy the tumor with the rays, and at the same time avoid 
destroying the healthy tissue? 
  
CREATIVE IDEA ILL-DEFINED MENTAL REPRESENTATIONS   50 
Appendix C 
Judging Criteria: 
You will be trained how to read information about artists’ art-making process and then put them 
into two categories: one that you think is indicative of one theory about the creative art-making 
process, and another that is indicative of another theory. You will first be given the identifying 
characteristics of Theory S or Theory H. You will practice on toy examples until your answers 
indicate that you understand the distinction between H and S, and until you yourself claim that 
you understand this distinction. Then you will classify the real responses as S or H. 
Identifying Characteristics of Theory S 
- If multiple ideas are given, they are considered separate and distinct from one another; 
not hard to dis-entangle. 
- Does not contain extra ideas that would be relevant to other types of paintings or creative 
tasks but that are irrelevant to this particular painting. 
- Distinct possible ways of going about the task may be separated by words such as ‘or’ 
without anything to indicate these two ways are connected in the creator’s mind. 
- The creative process involves searching one’s mind for ways to go about the painting and 
selecting amongst these distinct possible outcomes. 
- No common core to possible painting outcomes. 
- No new emergent characteristics of painting come to light through process of resolving 
how initial idea for painting will be carried out. 
Identifying Characteristics of Theory H 
- If multiple ideas are given, they are jumbled together; hard to dis-entangle. 
- Contains extra ideas that would be relevant to other types of creative tasks but that is not 
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relevant to creating this particular painting.  
- Ill-defined or indistinct ideas; challenge is to make them concrete. 
- Common core to different possible painting outcomes; core could be taken in different 
directions. 
- Words indicative of H theory: vague, ill-defined, indistinct, potential. 
- New emergent characteristics of painting, or new self-understanding come to light 
through process of resolving how initial idea for painting will be carried out; transformative.  
 
Note: It is not necessary to meet all criteria in order to be properly classified as indicative of one 
theory of the other. Also, it is not necessary to distribute your classifications evenly; it is possible 
that 5 in a row might be indicative of one theory and not the other. In fact, it is completely 
possible that they all could be one theory and not the other. Please classify each answer as 
indicative of one theory or the other even if you are not sure of your answer. 
